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Low desire, trauma, and femininity in the DSM-5: A case for sequelae 
 





The recently released DSM-5 (2013) includes a new sexual dysfunction: Female Sexual 
Interest/Arousal Disorder (FSIAD). For the first time, the low sexual desire disorders are split 
along gender lines, and lack of sexual ‘receptivity’ is offered as a criterion for diagnosis in 
women only. Although ‘severe relationship distress’ or other ‘significant stressors’ are to be 
considered during evaluation for FSIAD, the patient’s trauma history is not evaluated as part of 
the protocol. The presence of violence or distress can potentially elicit a differential diagnosis, 
but what constitutes ‘severity’ is not articulated either, except to designate ‘partner violence’ as 
the primary example. Thus, past relational violence, sexual abuse, and trauma are not explicitly 
considered—nor is the vast spectrum of gendered violations that many women describe 
experiencing on a regular basis. I examine potential problems with separating the trauma 
diagnoses (i.e., Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, Depersonalization/Derealization Disorder, and 
other Trauma- and Stressor-Related or Dissociative Disorders) from FSIAD in the DSM-5. 
Drawing on interviews with low-desiring women who describe being violated, I elaborate how 
this diagnostic separation may be re-traumatizing for women who have experienced such 
violence and have low sexual desire as a result. I also question the utility of framing 
psychological disorders and symptoms as ‘comorbid’ (i.e., concomitant but unrelated) and argue 
instead for more thorough etiological or ‘sequelic’ investigations of low desire. 
 
Keywords: Female Sexual Interest/Arousal Disorder (FSIAD), Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD), trauma, violence, desire, gender 
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Concerns regarding the medicalization and psychiatric diagnosing of ‘normal human 
variation’—specifically as these diagnoses pertain to sexuality, desire, gender identity, and other 
individual sexual behaviors and expressions—are well-documented (for examples, see Boyle, 
1993; Moynihan, 2005; Moynihan & Mintzes, 2010; Tiefer, 1995, 1996, 2001). In this article, I 
draw attention to the implications of a specific diagnosis, one that is new to the DSM-5: Female 
Sexual Interest/Arousal Disorder or FSIAD. FSIAD replaced the DSM-IV diagnosis of 
Hypoactive Sexual Desire Disorder (HSDD) in Women and also incorporated another DSM-IV 
diagnosis, Female Sexual Arousal Disorder (FSAD). This new disorder is only diagnosed in 
women, and its introduction is worth examining, as—according to recent research—around a 
third of women in the U.S. lack interest in sex or experience distress due to their low sexual 
desire (Laumann, Paik, & Rosen, 1999; West, et al., 2008) and thus may be potential candidates 
for diagnosis with FSIAD. 
I have articulated critiques of FSIAD on several bases elsewhere (Spurgas 2013a, 2013b). 
First, female receptivity is prescribed in the diagnosis, via its foundation within the ‘alternative 
female sexual response model’ (Basson, 2000, 2001). The ‘alternative female sexual response 
model’ as described originally by Rosemary Basson argues that women have naturally lower sex 
drives than men do, that they are more often motivated to engage in sex because of perceived 
possible ‘incentives’ or ‘rewards’ to do so (e.g., fostering relational harmony or intimacy or 
pleasing a partner), that they experience subjective arousal (i.e., in the form of rational 
motivations to have sex) that is often out of sync with their physical or genital arousal (i.e., 
discordance), and that they are not driven to reach orgasm in the same way men are. For Basson 
and her followers, this indicated that the traditional Human Sexual Response Cycle (HSRC) 
model of sexuality (as described by Masters and Johnson, 1966), with its emphasis on sexual 
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release, does not accurately describe women’s experiences of sex, and that a new model, 
specifically for women, was required. This new model—in opposition to the linear and ‘male-
focused’ HSRC—made uniquely feminine ‘receptivity’ or ‘responsive desire’ its cornerstone. 
Prior to the publication of the DSM-5, Lori Brotto (2010) described how some of the tenets of the 
alternative female sexual response model would be included in the new female-specific low 
desire diagnosis in an article in the Archives of Sexual Behavior.  
Brotto (2010), a member of the DSM-5’s work group on sexual and gender identity 
disorders and one of the primary authors of the FSIAD diagnosis, has argued that the term 
‘interest’ is a better descriptor than ‘desire’ for women, as many women do not experience 
spontaneous or ‘untriggered’ sexual desire. Instead, she states, they may become physically 
aroused (e.g., upon receiving sexual overtures from an interested partner) and then become 
‘interested’ in having sex as a result. Thus, Brotto (2010) argues that ‘if one adopts the view that 
sexual desire is triggered, then a more appropriate determination of low desire would be the 
woman who never experiences sexual desire at any point during a sexual encounter—before or 
after experiencing sexual arousal’ (p. 226, italics in original).1   
                                                        
 
1
 Brotto (2010) sometimes refers to the ‘alternative sexual response cycle’ in non-gendered terms 
in her article, and engages with critiques of a linear model of desire on the basis that ‘the Masters 
and Johnson model purports that women (and men) first experience sexual desire before 
experiencing sexual arousal [which she argues, along with Basson, is untrue]’ (p. 226, italics 
added). Although she includes the parenthetical caveat that men, as well as women, may 
experience ‘responsive desire,’ her model of sexual responsiveness in this article is based on 
Basson’s (2000, 2001) model of responsiveness, which Basson defines as applying specifically 
to women. In addition, up until the last few years, research on sexual responsiveness was 
uniquely conducted on women. Thus, there is a problematic slippage between: 1.) an empirical 
lack of evidence to support responsiveness in men, and 2.) a theoretical instantiation of uniquely 
female responsive desire. As I will argue, the existence of two separate low desire diagnoses in 
the DSM-5, one for men and one for women, with correspondingly gendered language in each 
(e.g., an emphasis on receptivity and responsiveness in FSIAD), discursively and diagnostically 
produces masculine and feminine desire, and male and female sexuality, as very different. 
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The diagnostic institution of ‘interest’ and ‘arousal’ and the concomitant removal of 
‘desire’ under the terms of FSIAD (but not for the male diagnosis of Male Hypoactive Sexual 
Desire Disorder or MHSDD) indicate the DSM-5 sexual and gender identity disorders 
workgroup’s belief that an ‘incentive-motivation’ (Laan & Both, 2008) model of sexuality or 
‘motivational theory of desire’ (Brotto, 2010) is applicable to women uniquely (or, at least, 
primarily). The language of the diagnosis (and its absence from the language of the 
corresponding diagnosis for men, MHSDD) also implies their belief that women are more 
sexually receptive than men—or, that healthy, sexually functional females are characterized by 
‘responsive desire’ to their partners. The full FSIAD entry subsumes the following criteria:  
Lack of, or significantly reduced, sexual interest/arousal as manifested by at least three of 
the following indicators: 1. absent/reduced interest in sexual activity, 2. absent/reduced 
sexual/erotic thoughts or fantasies, 3. no/reduced initiation of sexual activity and 
typically unreceptive to a partner’s attempts to initiate, 4. absent/reduced sexual 
excitement/pleasure during sexual activity in almost all or all (approximately 75%-100%) 
sexual encounters (in identified situational contexts or, if generalized, in all contexts), 5. 
absent/reduced sexual interest/arousal in response to any internal or external 
sexual/erotic cues (i.e. written, verbal, visual), and 6. absent/reduced genital or nongenital 
sensations during sexual activity in almost all or all (approximately 75%-100%) sexual 
encounters (in identified situational contexts or, if generalized, in all contexts) (APA, 
2013, p. 433, italics added).  
Many heterosexist assumptions are spelled out directly in the language of the FSIAD 
diagnosis in the DSM-5, and the presumed difference between masculine and feminine desire is 
particularly evident when comparing FSIAD to MHSDD (for men, desire and arousal disorders 
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were retained as separate entities). The only definitional criterion for MHSDD is: ‘persistently or 
recurrently deficient (or absent) sexual/erotic thoughts or fantasies and desire for sexual activity’ 
(APA, 2013, p. 440). The terms ‘interest’ and ‘responsiveness’ are not used in the MHSDD 
‘Diagnostic Criteria’ at all, whereas in the section entitled ‘Diagnostic Features’ (which directly 
follows the ‘Diagnostic Criteria’ for all diagnoses in the DSM-5) in the entry for FSIAD, 
‘responsiveness’ and ‘interest’ are articulated throughout: 
…sexual interest/arousal disorder may be expressed as a lack of interest in sexual  
activity, an absence of erotic or sexual thoughts, and reluctance to initiate sexual activity  
and respond to a partner’s sexual invitations…(APA, 2013, p. 433, italics added). 
Here, it is very clear that it is expected that women often won’t feel sexual until their [male] 
partner ‘invites’ them to ‘respond with desire.’ In contrast, in the MHSDD diagnosis, sexual 
‘receptivity’ or ‘responsiveness’ to a partner’s advances are not discussed in the beginning of the 
entry in either the ‘Diagnostic Criteria’ or the ‘Diagnostic Features’ sections, and are instead not 
mentioned at all until much later in the entry, in the ‘Associated Features Supporting Diagnosis’ 
section. Once these constructs are mentioned, it is with a caveat or qualifier regarding men’s 
situational preference for their partner to initiate sex (thus, responsiveness is not framed as a core 
component of male sexuality): 
Although men are more likely to initiate sexual activity, and thus low desire may be  
characterized by a pattern of non-initiation, many men may prefer to have their partner  
initiate sexual activity. In such situations, the man’s lack of receptivity to a partner’s  
initiation should be considered when evaluating low desire (APA, 2013, p. 441, italics  
added). 
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In these excerpts from the diagnostic terminology, there is no mistaking how the sexual 
difference discourse of the alternative female sexual response model has been imported into the 
diagnosis. It is without question that men’s and women’s sexual dysfunctions—and thus their 
normal or functional states, as counterparts—are framed as not only disparate, but opposed, with 
women posited as inherently more sexually receptive, and as a corollary, more discordant or 
dissociative (as will be explained below). This notion of women’s naturally discordant state is 
also articulated in the diagnosis through numerous references to experimental psychological 
research which utilizes vaginal photoplethysmography. Some of this is the same experimental 
research used to instantiate the transition from female ‘desire’ to ‘interest/arousal’ in Brotto 
(2010). 
The framework for FSIAD thus also shares common assumptions with experimental 
psychological research that purports that women’s subjective sexual desire is naturally detached 
from their objective physical genital response (for examples, see Chivers, 2010; Chivers & 
Bailey, 2005; Chivers, Seto & Blanchard, 2007; Chivers, Seto, Lalumière, Laan, & Grimbos, 
2010). In multiple places throughout the FSIAD diagnostic entry, the powerful influences of 
notions of female receptivity and responsiveness, in line with the alternative female sexual 
response model, and also of female discordance, in line with the suppositions of vaginal 
photoplethysmographic research, are evident. The relevance of these constructs and model is 
based on the belief that women (whether they are diagnosed with FSIAD or not) are naturally 
discordant, or that their sexual minds and bodies are disconnected. This same research suggests 
that men are naturally more ‘in tune’ with or perceptive of their own subjective desire and that 
this desire is physically expressed through their objective genital response—that is, that men are 
more sexually ‘concordant’ than women (Chivers, Seto, & Blanchard, 2007; Chivers, et al., 
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2010). The notion that even women without sexual arousal concerns often cannot get an accurate 
‘read’ on their own physiological excitement is espoused in this research, as is the notion that 
most women are more likely than men to be physiologically sexually responsive whenever 
presented with sexual stimuli (as operationalized by vaginal lubrication and vasocongestion). 
Research based on comparing objective genital response to subjective psychological arousal (or 
subjective perceptions of objective arousal) via photoplethysmographic measure while subjects 
watch pornography suggests that women are less ‘category-specific’ (Chivers, Seto, & 
Blanchard, 2007) or ‘target-specific’ (Brotto, 2010) than are men—men are more likely to be 
physically aroused by ‘targets’ of ‘their preferred gender’ (Chivers, Seto, & Blanchard, 2007, p. 
1109) based on their stated sexual orientation, whereas women are more likely to be physically 
aroused based on the general ‘sexual nature of the stimulus’ rather than by the gender of the 
‘target’ (Brotto, 2010, p. 224) as would be expected based on their stated sexual orientation. This 
general state of female arousal, regardless of subjective experience of desire or perception of 
genital arousal, is highlighted under ‘Diagnostic Features’ for FSIAD in the DSM-5 when the 
authors state: ‘…physiological measures of genital sexual response do not differentiate women 
who report sexual arousal concerns from those who do not…’ and under ‘Risk and Prognostic 
Factors’ when the work group writes: ‘Psychophysiological research using vaginal 
photoplethysmography has not found [objectively measured] differences between women with 
and without perceived lack of genital arousal’ (APA, 2013, p. 435). In these statements, we see 
evidence of the framing of female sexuality as based in a mind-body disconnect, and the positing 
that women are innately or neurobiologically dissociative.2 Although this supposition is not 
                                                        
 
2
 According to Chivers et al. (2010) female discordance may be the result of an evolutionary 
adaptation designed to help women make more evolutionarily sound choices regarding whom 
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spelled out directly in the DSM-5 entry for FSIAD, it is promulgated in the research that the 
FSIAD authors reference, and thus it is of concern regarding the diagnosis itself. As I will argue, 
dissociation may very well be part of some women’s experience of sex; what is problematic is 
the idea that dissociation is somehow inherently or naturally female, rather than a consequence 
of the gendered violence and pursuant trauma that women experience disproportionately around 
the world today. 
In this essay, I analyze possible negative effects of the FSIAD diagnosis on low-desiring 
women who have sex with men, effects which may be particularly deleterious for women who 
have experienced sexual and gendered violence and, in some cases, corresponding trauma, over 
the course of their lives. The relationship or comorbidity among FSIAD and the Trauma- or 
Stressor-Related and Dissociative Disorders in the DSM-5 is not adequately theorized nor 
accounted for in the current diagnostic protocol, and thus how trauma may potentially be related 
to low desire is not discussed. I argue that the new diagnosis may, in effect, be iatrogenically re-
traumatizing for some low-desiring women, due to the fact that the current diagnostic protocol 
may lead to clinicians missing important historic traumas that women have experienced, and as 
such may lead to the continuation of a pattern of women being unable to integrate and respond to 
experiences of sexual violation. Although this clinical re-traumatization is obviously not of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
they mate with: ‘Unlike men…concordance is not necessary for women to engage in sexual 
intercourse. In fact, the more conservative sexual strategy (in terms of greater choosiness 
regarding sexual partners, having fewer sexual partners and longer term relationships) adopted 
by many women might be compromised by high concordance (see Symons, 1979). From this 
perspective, partial independence of psychological and genital processes may aid female sexual 
decision-making by reducing arousal-dependent appraisal of suitable mates…’ (p. 50). Graham 
(2010), the other primary author of the FSIAD diagnosis cites this research, and Brotto (2010) 
herself cites other research by Chivers and her colleagues (e.g., Chivers, Seto, & Blanchard, 
2007). This incorporation demonstrates how the evolutionary psychology perspective (e.g., 
Symons, 1979, cited in the excerpt above) on sexual difference in regards to concordance is also 
fundamentally intertwined with the FSIAD diagnosis.  
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same magnitude as actual sexual and gendered interpersonal violence, foreclosing an analysis of 
the relationship between trauma and low desire via the FSIAD protocol may set up women who 
have previously been the victims of traumatic sexual violence to be further traumatized in the 
future.  
Importantly, while ‘severe relationship distress (e.g., partner violence)’3 is listed as a 
circumstance that might preclude diagnosis with FSIAD in Criterion D, neither Posttraumatic 
Stress Disorder (PTSD) nor Depersonalization/Derealization Disorder are listed as potentially 
comorbid at the end of the diagnostic entry. In the DSM-5, PTSD is characterized by symptoms 
of intrusion, dissociation, avoidance, hyperarousal, and other negative alterations in mood and 
cognition following exposure to a ‘traumatic event,’ which may include ‘actual or threatened 
death, serious injury, or sexual violence’ (APA, 2013, p. 271). Depersonalization/Derealization 
Disorder is characterized by experiences of ‘unreality’ and ‘detachment’ with respect to either 
one’s own ‘thoughts, feelings, sensations, body, or actions’ or to one’s surroundings (APA, 
2013, p. 302), and these symptoms are reportedly found in the ‘aftermath of trauma’ (APA, 
2013, p. 291). That neither of these disorders are listed as comorbid with FSIAD is remarkable, 
as, in the cases of PTSD, Depersonalization/Derealization Disorder, and other Trauma- and 
Stressor-Related and Dissociative Disorders, sexual violence is cited as a quintessential 
‘traumatic event’ which might elicit these symptoms. The authors of the DSM-5 never define 
‘trauma’ explicitly, but in the Introduction to the chapter on Trauma- and Stressor-Related 
Disorders, they mention ‘clinical distress following exposure to catastrophic or aversive events’ 
                                                        
3







and state that ‘psychological distress following exposure to a traumatic or stressful event is quite 
variable’ (APA, 2013, p. 265). Judith Herman (1992) has further elucidated trauma as involving 
the overwhelming experience, witnessing, or threat of physical or psychological terror, injury, 
harm, and concomitant loss of control or feelings of powerlessness. It is worth noting that even 
in clinical expositions, a clear definition of ‘trauma’ remains elusive, as the experience is clearly 
subjective, volatile, nebulous, and persists in a shifting taxonomy of symptoms, as a syndrome. 
The possibility that sexual arousal and interest problems might be part of this systemic 
chain of traumatic sequelae or a syndromic network is not outlined anywhere in the current 
DSM-5. Thus, although assessing the possible presence of ‘clear and present’ severe relationship 
distress when diagnosing FSIAD may be a step in the right direction for responsible treatment, 
this criterion does not go far enough in accounting for external, environmental-structural, or 
inter-relational stressors that might influence low desire, particularly in women who have been 
subjected to sexual and gendered violence in the past or throughout their lives, as part of a 
pattern. This type of violence is not always traumatic for women (according to current clinical 
definitions of ‘trauma’); but, in their naming of sexual violence as one of the most common 
traumatic events that individuals experience, the authors of the DSM-5 imply that, in many cases, 
exposure to this type of violence is, in fact, traumatic for those who endure or witness it. The 
spectrum of gendered and sexualized violations that women experience—from childhood sexual 
abuse to relationship violence to street harassment to the daily experience of living in fear that 
any of these potentially traumatic incidents may occur at any time—must be accounted for when 
diagnosing FSIAD. This is particularly important as women are disproportionately affected by 
intimate partner violence, sexual violence, and stalking: nearly 1 in 5 women in the United States 
report experiencing rape at some time in their lives, 13% report experiencing other forms of 
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sexual coercion, and 1 in 4 report being the victims of relationship violence (Centers for Disease 
Control, 2012, 2014). In this essay, I utilize qualitative interview data gathered from research 
conducted with low-desiring women to assess the link between low desire and the experience of 
sexual and gendered violence (which, in some cases, is associated with trauma). 
From 2011-2014, I conducted a series of in-depth interviews with women from diverse 
racial, ethnic, and sexual orientation backgrounds regarding their sexual histories and 
experiences of low desire. All participants were between the ages of 18 and 55 (all but three were 
under the age of 40) and resided in the New York/New Jersey area (except for one Canadian 
citizen, who was interviewed via Skype). Participants responded to flyers posted in coffee shops, 
grocery stores, universities, and health and medical clinics around New York City, and additional 
participants were contacted via snowball sample of the original participants. For this larger 
project, I ultimately interviewed 37 women4 who had experienced low desire at some point in 
their lives, who had at some point been sexually involved with men, and the majority of whom 
had experienced sexual and gendered violence and, in some cases, corresponding trauma. As I 
conducted interviews it became apparent that almost all of the women who self-selected for 
participation in the study due to their experience of low desire had also experienced sexual or 
gendered violence in some form or another during the course of their lives. I emphasize this 
because experience of violence (and potential pursuant trauma) was not a prerequisite criterion 
                                                        
4 It is important to note that all of the participants in my study were cisgendered women (they 
identify as women and had been assigned a female sex designation at birth), and the men they 
described having sex with were cisgendered men—although many currently identify as queer, 
and many are no longer in heterosexual relationships. Previous or current sexual relations with 
cisgendered men was an important variable, as this study examines the role of heteronormativity 
and patriarchal violence in low-desiring women’s experiences of their own femininity, and as it 
paid particular attention to experiences in early and present-day sexual, romantic, emotional, and 
familial relationships with men. This research thus contributes to the burgeoning field of critical 
heterosexuality studies (Fischer, 2013).  
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for participation in the study, yet it is clearly linked with low desire, at least for the women in my 
small sample5.  
Here, through select personal experience narratives drawn from this data, I illuminate the 
complex ways that low desire, lack of interest, arousal troubles, sexual and gendered violence, 
fear, and trauma come together for women. This analysis indicates that in order to effectively 
care for women with sexual interest and arousal problems, clinicians must first fully explore their 
patients’ possible traumatic histories and other gendered relational experiences that may have 
negatively affected these women’s sexualities and desire patterns. Thus, more thorough 
etiological investigations of low sexual interest/arousal are in order. It seems that ‘etiology’ has 
become a dirty word in our post-Freudian psychological health climate, but a renewed attention 
to the frameworks of traumatic syndrome and sequelae—including for mental health concerns 
which are always relational, always political, and often experienced differently based on gender 
and other social variables—are necessary from an ethical and feminist standpoint. Attention to 
psychic history and trauma need not be delimited by Oedipal frameworks nor the rigid categories 
associated with traditional Freudian psychoanalysis; this attention may be more in line with the 
                                                        
5
 Although I did not ask my participants whether or not they had ever been diagnosed with any 
Trauma- or Stressor-Related or Dissociative Disorder, many described experiencing the types of 
gendered and sexual violence and abuse which in many cases do result in trauma (Herman, 
1992), and some mentioned PTSD or described symptoms consistent with a diagnosis (it was 
unclear whether or not these individuals had received a clinical diagnosis from a practitioner). 
Many participants used terms such as ‘traumatic,’ ‘violent,’ ‘violating,’ ‘coercive,’ and ‘abusive’ 
to described previous sexual experiences, and did not clearly distinguish among these terms. 
They also used this language to describe the development of their own sexualities, femininities, 
and experiences of ‘living as women in the world.’ Thus, in keeping with the colloquial and 
loose way these terms were used by my participants at the expense of precise medical or legal 
terminology, I focus on the pervasive experience of gendered violence and sexual transgressions 
while acknowledging that these result in clinical trauma for some, but not all, women. I do not 
suggest that every participant in my study fits the criteria for diagnosis with PTSD or any other 
Trauma- or Stressor-Related or Dissociative Disorder. 
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types of psychoanalytic endeavors put forth by feminist and other relational analysts (for an 
example, see Benjamin, 1988) and thus consider affective, material, sociorelational patterns that 
deeply affect our psychic lives. In this vein, we may also usefully reattend to and reconceptualize 
the psychosomatic—another seemingly dirty word in our current neurobiological and cognitive-
behavioral milieu.  
I call for a renewed attention to feminist analyses of trauma and PTSD (Brison, 2008; 
Brown, 1991; Herman, 1992) and to a complex/developmental trauma framework (van der Kolk, 
2005)—specifically for women and other individuals who disproportionately experience sexual 
and gendered violence. In clinical terms, I call for a deep and honest reconsideration of the vast 
scope of ‘specifiers’ that Graham (2010) has articulated regarding desire problems, including 
partner, relationship, individual vulnerability, cultural, religious, and medical factors. 
Importantly, it must be stated that my analysis here is not a call for further ‘medicalization’ or 
diagnosis of women’s desire troubles6—but it is an acknowledgment of two things: 1.) receiving 
help for problems which have negatively impacted our mental and physical health is already a 
firmly medicalized (and individualized) endeavor and one that often relies on navigating DSM 
diagnoses, and 2.) there is a rich history of recuperation, reclamation, and strategic subversion of 
the language of dysfunction and disorder via powerful social movements which turn diagnoses 
against themselves and effectively queer them, particularly as these movements have grappled 
with and made use of the sex, gender, and sexuality diagnoses through the various incarnations 
                                                        
6
 I acknowledge that my incorporation of a feminist psychoanalytic framework cannot be fully 
divorced from a medical framework. A feminist psychoanalytic therapeutic encounter between a 
clinician and patient, in accordance with the way I discuss that encounter, would involve a more 
thorough accounting of history, power, interpersonal relationships, and the sociopolitical context 
in which diagnoses are made, though, and would thus eschew some of the most glaring problems 
with ‘medicalization’ that I cite here (this is in line with the type of ‘feminist therapy theory’ 
espoused by Brown, 1991, among others). 
 14 
of the DSM. We must navigate medical discourses and institutions even as we politicize and 
resist the experiences and relationships they diagnose and disorder. It is necessary to attend to the 
gendered political implications of FSIAD and the relational, non-medical reasons why women 
might have low desire, while simultaneously acknowledging that sexual problems are currently 
dealt with in the medical realm. In light of this, that realm is a good place from which to begin to 
do this work—whether our goals are ultimately reformist or revolutionary. 
 
Female Sexual Interest/Arousal Disorder: Prescribing female receptivity in the DSM-5 
Since its initial publication in 1952, the DSM has consistently included at least one diagnosis for 
sexual difficulties. Over the last sixty years, the sexual diagnoses expanded to include arousal, 
orgasm, desire, and pain disorders, in line with the Human Sexual Response Cycle as outlined by 
Masters and Johnson (1966). Although sexual troubles such as ‘frigidity’ were arguably always 
pathologized and feminized under the various diagnoses, the language of the desire disorders 
themselves has remained gender-neutral since the institution of the first desire disorder, Inhibited 
Sexual Desire (ISD), in 1987—that is, until the publication of the latest version. 
In light of the ‘receptivity’ or ‘responsiveness’ criterion included in FSIAD, an analysis 
of the aspects of the diagnosis that will be particularly troublesome for trauma survivors is 
paramount. In the ‘Differential Diagnosis’ section for FSIAD, ‘severe relationship distress, such 
as intimate partner violence’ is listed as a circumstance that would cause a clinician to consider 
not diagnosing a woman’s low desire as evidence of FSIAD. Non-sexual issues such as 
‘significant stressors’ are mentioned in the terminology of both MHSDD and FSIAD in Criterion 
D (the presence of which would require consideration of a differential diagnosis or no diagnosis 
at all), but throughout the majority of the entry for FSIAD, ‘relationship or interpersonal distress’ 
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is listed as associated (‘comorbid’) with low desire, or, more frequently, low desire is cited as a 
cause of relationship distress, as it is in the following passage: ‘Distress may be experienced as a 
result of the lack of sexual interest/arousal or as a result of [the lack of interest/arousal’s] 
significant interference in a woman’s life and well-being’ (APA, 2013, p. 434). It is unclear how 
this lack of sexual interest/arousal might specifically interfere in the diagnosee’s ‘life and well-
being,’ but, as low desire is spelled out as a relational problem in Criterion A3 (as it may be 
associated with a woman’s lack of receptivity to her initiating partner), this framing begs the 
question of whether or how her partner’s sexual satisfaction contributes to a diagnosee’s quality 
of life and well-being. Given the way relationality is taken into account in the diagnosis, it seems 
plausible that, in some cases, the interference in a diagnosed woman’s life quality could be a 
result of her partner’s dissatisfaction, which might create a problem with relational discord. 
Further down in the diagnostic entry, the notion of distress is mentioned again in the ‘Functional 
Consequences of FSIAD’ section: ‘Difficulties in sexual interest/arousal are often associated 
with decreased relationship satisfaction’ (APA, 2013, p. 436), and, again, in the ‘Comorbidity’ 
section. In all of these examples, it seems curious that relationship or interpersonal distress is 
articulated as ‘associated with,’ ‘comorbid with,’ and ‘resulting’ from low desire, but it is never 
assessed as a possible cause of low desire. 
In addition, only ‘severe relationship distress,’ such as ‘partner violence’ is mentioned as 
a possible trauma-related reason to not diagnose a woman with FSIAD. But, it is unclear how 
‘severity’ will be measured as a factor that may lead to a differential diagnosis7. It is also striking 
                                                        
7
 This lack of clarity around ‘severity’ begs the questions: Is clear-cut physical violence or 
brutality at the hands of a present partner the only legitimate form of ‘severe relationship 
distress’ that might factor into a reconsideration of the diagnosis? Are other kinds of distress 
legitimate? Just how distressing must these factors be to sensibly or legitimately affect a 
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that the experience of violence that must warrant a differential diagnosis is tacitly defined as 
contemporary, current violence, while the possibility of earlier traumatic experiences or histories 
of abuse are not accounted for. A larger discussion around the murky terrain between coercion 
and consent is never taken up, and the hyperbolization and hypostatization of ‘severe relationship 
distress’ and its equation with intimate partner violence or abuse is problematic; feminist 
clinicians and researchers (for recent examples, see Christianson [2014] and Tolman, Spencer, 
Rosen-Reynoso, & Porche [2003]) have suggested that there is indeed a very grey area in terms 
of what is consensual—let alone what is desirable or worthy of interest—when it comes to 
sexual relations, including heterosexual intercourse (which is the type of sex that is implied in 
both of these heteronormative diagnoses [MHSDD and FSIAD]).  
Some therapists, such as Kleinplatz (2011) and Tyler (2009), have argued that building 
the notion of female receptivity into the FSIAD diagnosis as a normative construct may be 
harmful to women, particularly those who have experienced sexual and gendered violence. 
Illuminating the stories of women who have undergone treatment for sexual dysfunction is thus a 
powerful way to demonstrate potential problems with the diagnosis. Two of the women I 
interviewed had been treated in a program designed to help women overcome female sexual 
dysfunctions, including vestibular vulvodynia, Genito-Pelvic Pain/Penetration Disorder, and 
comorbid Hypoactive Sexual Desire Disorder in Women (their treatment was prior to the 
publication of the DSM-5 and the institution of FSIAD). As only two of my participants had 
undergone this type of treatment, these results are in no way generalizable. But, their stories do 
highlight some of the biggest problems with the receptivity criterion and associated aspects of 
FSIAD, and, as these women are both survivors of sexual and gendered violence and both 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
woman’s responsive desire? What if the violence is distressing to her, but not to her initiating 
partner? And: who will be making the call? 
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identify as low-desiring (or did at the time of their treatment), their narratives help us explore the 
relationship between low desire, physical pain, and the experience of violence, and warn of 
problems with diagnosing FSIAD in women with this particular set of experiences. In North 
America, one way that women are increasingly encouraged to learn how to ‘get back in touch’ 
with their body’s ‘natural’ state of arousal is through Mindfulness-based Cognitive Behavioral 
Therapy or MCBT (Brotto, 2011; Brotto, Basson & Luria, 2008; Brotto, Krychman & Jacobson, 
2008)—a type of cognitive behavioral therapy that incorporates the Buddhist technique of 
meditative mindfulness to help women stay ‘focused’ and ‘present’ during a sexual encounter. 
The treatment programs my participants had been through involved the use of MCBT among 
other techniques. One of these participants, Astrid, had deep criticisms of the program, and 
specifically of the alternative female sexual response model: 
They explained that in the course of a normal relationship—a heterosexual relationship 
just understood—that, at first, both the man and the woman might experience this 
‘spontaneous desire’ for sex with each other, but as time would go on, the man might still 
experience that, but the woman would no longer experience the spontaneous desire… 
what she would experience instead would be sort of a willingness to engage in sex. So, 
for reasons of increasing the intimacy levels or whatever—like, ‘we get to cuddle at the 
end’ and stuff—we [the treatment program participants] would have been willing to 
respond to the advances of our husbands or the men in our lives, and that this is kind of 
how normal relationships go…in the beginning, you have mutual desire that’s like, you 
see each other and you desire each other, but as things go on the guy still has that but the 
lady doesn’t have that anymore, and so she’s like more willing to be seduced…[later in 
the course of the program] the men [male partners] were given a chance to talk about how 
frustrated they were [about their partners’ lack of desire], then they were educated in this 
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‘response cycle’ thing, that we had also been taught about: ‘Well, you might feel 
spontaneous desire for her, but she may need to be coaxed into it’ kind of thing. 
Kelly, another participant who had been treated in a program designed to help alleviate her 
vaginal pain and low desire, stated: 
The idea was [to use MCBT] so that I could continue to have sex, which is kind of weird 
because if I didn’t want to have sex [Kelly explained that she was not interested in sex at 
all during this time], why am I doing exercises so I can continue doing it? So that was 
kind of strange…and male-focused! Because if I wasn’t enjoying sex at the time, then it’s 
something that I’m doing almost just so that my boyfriend can still have sex with me, it 
wasn’t something that would help me with my own pleasure… 
In both Astrid’s and Kelly’s comments, the heteronormative bias of the alternative female sexual 
response model for women is clear8. It is also clear how, through these treatment programs, 
women were taught what the normative framework for women’s desire is—a framework that is 
based on receptivity, responsiveness, and a willingness to be seduced or coaxed into sex by an 
initiating male partner. These participants were also taught that the kind of sex they were not 
going to naturally or spontaneously desire, but also that they should be receptive to engaging in 
for their male partner’s benefit, likely involved penetrative intercourse with a focus on male 
pleasure. Thus, women were not only taught what their own desire should feel like, but what 
                                                        
8
 I do not suggest that the human sexual response cycle (HSRC) as articulated by Masters and 
Johnson (1966) is more appropriate for women (or men) than the alternative female sexual 
response model, only that the alternative female sexual response model does not offer a true or 
viable alternative to the HSRC and thus does not account for the diversity of human desire, 
which, in many cases, is not sexually dimorphic (as either essentialist model purports). Masters’ 
and Johnson’s HSRC has been critiqued at length elsewhere (for examples, see Tiefer 1995, 
1996, 2001), and both Angel (2013) and I (Spurgas 2013a,b) have elucidated how some of these 
feminist critiques and the alternative female sexual response model itself unfortunately reinscribe 
binary, gendered, and rigid frameworks for sexual desire. 
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kind of sex they were meant to be engaging in, and for whose enjoyment. These normative 
assumptions pose particular problems for survivors of sexual and gendered violence, which both 
Astrid and Kelly were. In the remainder of this essay, I present participants’ narratives to shed 
light on how gendered violence and pursuant trauma have informed their senses of their own 
femininity, and their experiences of sex throughout their lives—experiences which emphasize 
the gendering of sexuality and of desire itself. Immediately below, I allow women’s stories to 
briefly speak back to the alternative female sexual response model, with its emphasis on arousal 
preceding desire. 
 
Desire, arousal, interest: Linkages and lacunae among embodied sexual states  
In order to gain insight about the new DSM-5 diagnosis of Female Sexual Interest/Arousal 
Disorder (FSIAD), to better understand the transition away from Hypoactive Desire Disorder 
(HSDD) in Women, and also to gain a clearer understanding of the female-specificity of the new 
diagnosis, I asked my participants about how their desire, arousal, and interest link up (or do 
not). Although most of the women I interviewed were not aware of the content of the newest 
edition of the DSM, they were very much aware of scientific tropes about female receptivity, 
responsiveness, and passivity. They also had complex thoughts about the notion of a feminine 
disconnect among cognitive, emotional, and embodied states, and they were able to articulate 
very clearly the (important) place of desire in their own sexual lives. 
Most of the low-desiring women I interviewed stated that sex just doesn’t really ‘work’ if 
they are not ‘into it.’ For many of them, the alternative female sexual response model (including 
its emphasis on arousal preceding desire) did not make sense for them experientially, nor did 
they identify with it. The idea of cognitively or rationally inducing a sense of being receptive or 
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‘in the present’ (such as would be induced via MCBT), in order to mobilize a physical response 
and thus go forward with a sex act, also made some participants distinctly uncomfortable. It 
raised concerns about coercion versus consent. This sentiment is articulated succinctly by Annie, 
who is also a survivor of sexual abuse: 
I feel like if I’m not really into it, it doesn’t usually work that well, like I’ll have a harder 
time getting wet and actually aroused and excited…that [experiencing physical arousal 
before desire] has happened to me before —but it’s not really my preference. 
The desire to be in control of the terms of sex, of not wanting physical arousal to guide a sexual 
experience, was expressed by many participants—both sexual abuse survivors and women who 
had not experienced sexual abuse. Throughout my interviews, the notion that it is possible for 
arousal to precede desire, or for the two to feel ‘conflated’ (in line with the alternative female 
sexual response model as articulated by Basson [2001], Brotto [2010], and Graham [2010], 
among others), was a possible trajectory. But, almost all participants stated that they did not 
enjoy sex nearly as much when arousal preceded a clear sense of desire, and that sex was much 
more enjoyable when they felt a true longing, wanting, or desire for their partner. This notion is 
expounded by Marianne: 
The physical desire is always there [Marianne describes generally having a lot of 
spontaneous desire], but mentally and emotionally I shut down…so physically I’m like 
‘Yes, please, let’s go to bed together’ and I can feel my body heating up, I can feel all of 
the sexual cues kicking in…but emotionally I cannot handle it, and so I stop it…or if I do 
go through with it, I am not comfortable, I am not enjoying it. 
Molly expresses a similar sentiment about not enjoying sex if she is not truly desiring of, 
engaged with, and emotionally connected to her partner: 
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A lot of times I feel very dissociated, like my body is turned on, but my mind is not. So 
physically I have a reaction, like I get wet and—but mentally I don’t feel like I am really 
there. My body is showing all the signs of being turned on, but I don’t feel turned on…so 
a lot of times I kind of just go ‘Well, I’m wet, might as well have sex,’ and it’s okay, but 
it is not that much fun…even with him [a partner that she trusts] there have been times 
where I have gone, in my head, ‘Why am I doing this?’—where I have felt really 
disconnected and thought ‘I don’t want to do this anymore’…and that is what started to 
get me really turned off, that feeling of like my body responding, when my mind is 
not…that is a turnoff because I feel like it kind of increases the dissociative state…I 
know that your body can respond at times, even when you are being forced to do 
things…I don’t know if that’s what happened with [the man who abused her as a child], I 
don’t remember, but sometimes I wonder if that’s where some of that comes from, in 
terms of getting turned on physically but not feeling good about that unless my mind is 
incorporated. 
Molly’s and Marianne’s stories of emotional disconnection and dissociation, outlined above, are 
examples of why the diagnostic logic of arousal determining desire (or even simply being 
conflated with desire, with the constructs being brought together diagnostically) appears to 
exemplify a strange sanctioning of blurred consent. This logic also seems to sanction a 
medicalized supporting of one partner’s sexual wishes governing, defining, or taking precedent 
over another’s, which is potentially dangerous for women—particularly in that so many women 
have experienced abuse, rape, or other forms of sexual violence (or will at some point during 
their lives). These types of potentially coercive experiences range from overt violent infractions 
by strangers on the street to less clearly defined situations in which consent was not adequately 
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acquired from an intimate partner, date, acquaintance, or friend—or, instead, in which women 
were pressured to have sex that they ‘consented’ to by not explicitly saying ‘no,’ but did not feel 
comfortable with and thus did not feel was truly consensual. If low-desiring women (who are in 
some cases also victims of gendered violence) are keenly aware of the possibility and common 
experience of dissociating during sex, of experiencing depersonalization and derealization in a 
sexual moment, then it seems questionable to promote mindfulness as a remedy for low desire. 
In this context, mindfulness functions as a cognitive-behavioral prescription for women to 
overcome a mental state of not being fully ‘into it’ and an injunction to ‘follow the lead’ of their 
own aroused body—or worse, an aroused partner.  
 
The everyday nature of gendered violence 
The stories these low-desiring women told illuminated how gendered violence runs the gamut 
from more casual, everyday violations and microaggressions—which many women understand 
as ‘normal’ because of how common they are (Sociologists for Women in Society, 2014)—to 
more clear-cut and obvious forms of sexual violence, including childhood sexual abuse and 
‘stranger rape.’ Even women in this study who had not been the victims of rape or sexual abuse 
described being violated in other ways. Valdivia describes the everyday, quotidian, almost banal 
experience of gendered violence, and explains how she experiences this as a perpetual potential 
threat, as a constant nagging at her body and psyche, and as a pervasive ambiance of insistent 
inquiry as to whether or not she will give consent—concomitant with a tangible, felt disregard 
for her answer. She frames this foreclosure of consent as a deep, constitutive aspect of her own 
experience of femininity, and something that she learned and has lived from a very young age: 
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One of my first sexual experiences was when I was 13, my first French kiss, it was a 
super big deal, it was this intrusion of bodies, there was a tongue involved, there was 
groping involved, and it was definitely sexual even if it wasn’t called that. And I 
remember that this person didn’t ask me…that’s the thing, consent has only made its way 
into my life very recently. And consent is a thing that is so nebulous, surprisingly enough, 
it is frightening to me how nebulous it is…I can’t think of anything sexier than consent at 
this point. But that French kiss began a long career of non-consent…  
In light of Valdivia’s comments, it is also important to note that some low-desiring survivors of 
sexual abuse describe providing a service—not to their abusers, but to a society which relies on 
imagery and narratives of supposedly ‘valid’ or ‘real’ sexual abuse in order to excuse everyday, 
mundane, and casualized aggressions toward women. Within this framework, as long as we have 
so-called ‘legitimate’ victims of abuse, who have suffered at the hands of ‘authentic’ criminals 
who are pathological and ill, individuals who enact violence all the time in more quotidian ways 
can be absolved. Here, we have evidence of an affective economy in which one type of violence 
is authenticated, and can thus be made to excuse other types. This material-discursive system—
as it makes it appear as though child sexual abuse and ‘stranger’ rape are idiosyncratic and 
isolated occurrences—simultaneously exotifies and fetishizes these more obvious and clear-cut 
violences, making it seem as though these do not happen every day, as well. This 
heteropatriarchal economy of violence legitimation (that the authors of the FSIAD diagnosis 
draw upon) obscures the fact that even these more extreme forms of obvious and clear-cut 
violence are actually part of the quotidian landscape of many women’s lives, as much as the ‘less 
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extreme,’ casual, everyday violations and microagressions are also a part of this gendered 
landscape9. 
 Most of the low-desiring women I interviewed had experienced gendered violence, sexual 
coercion, and, in some cases, pursuant trauma, at some point in their lives. Several had 
experienced sexual molestation or abuse at very early ages, but many had not experienced 
childhood sexual abuse. Almost all of the women I spoke with described the larger, pervasive 
milieu in which their sexualities had developed as ‘violent,’ ‘violating,’ ‘traumatic,’ 
‘traumatizing,’ or ‘abusive,’ though, and they spoke of cultural expectations of (hetero)sexuality 
which are bound up with masculine aggression as regularly excusing violence and harassment of 
women, and of women’s bodies being violated in a variety of ways in everyday life and spaces. 
Sexual incursions could also happen closer to home, and many women described having sex with 
male partners with whom they did not feel they had particularly intentional sex lives. This notion 
illustrates the murky terrain of consent versus coercion and of intentionality versus 
haphazardness within mundane, banal forms of sexual intimacy—a realm that we do not 
generally associate with violation or coercion, unless in the ‘extreme’ forms of domestic or 
intimate partner violence. Regina sums up this sentiment about the murkiness of 
consent/coercion within intimate relationships, when I asked her if any sexual experience 
happened to her in her life that she thinks may have contributed to her low desire: 
I don’t think so, other than the history of having not wanted to have sex with my partner 
but doing it anyway, on just kind of a daily level…and certainly ‘consenting’ the entire 
time, but doing so very reluctantly… 
Regina’s statement makes it clear that what happens in the bedroom is not as far from what 
                                                        
9
 Feminist scholars, including popular writer Rebecca Solnit (2014), have made similar points 
about economies of violence within heteropatriarchal societies. 
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happens on the street as people often like to think. Evie extends this idea to street harassment and 
other forms of violence that women endure in non-intimate spaces: 
As sexually objectified people, we kind of channel these things—violations, traumas—
through our sexual activities—but at the same time it is so taboo to talk about it! You 
can’t have conversations like this—even though they are so part of our everyday lives! 
It’s almost a way to squash it, and not give women the power or control over the things 
that happen to them, because it’s not ‘cool’ to talk about it…I think that what happens is 
because these things are so normalized in our culture but not acknowledged—like the 
attacks, constant hollering [on the street, out in the world], the fact that one in three 
women get raped in their lives, these statistics, women are subject to sexual violence 
whether it is physical or emotional in nature—but at the same time, our society refuses to 
acknowledge it as a real problem and so it’s not ‘cool’ to talk about being a rape victim, 
like things get really ‘heavy.’ And it is very serious, but it becomes this thing where 
people don’t feel comfortable talking about it in everyday life even though it is part of 
our everyday life. 
Evie’s powerful statement elucidates the way sexual coercion and gendered violence are 
insidious and become hidden by cultural discourses that silence them, and which are even muted 
in our sex lives. She points to an idea that is subsequently perpetuated when discussions of 
sexual violence are framed as too ‘intense’—the notion that women should take the blame for 
these violations in the form of their own shame, or, alternately, that women should ‘lighten up’ 
about them. Many participants articulated similar thoughts, and some also expressed this notion 
of ‘voicelessness’ in terms of silence and dissociation during actual sexual acts, or in regards to 
speaking about the violence they have endured over the course of their lives. Many women 
 26 
described feeling voiceless not only in cultural representations and conversations about violence 
against women, but also when they were actually having sex, and in their intimate relationships. 
This theme is expressed by Elizabeth, who experienced sexual abuse as a child: 
I find it very hard to speak up for myself when it comes to sex. It’s harder than fighting 
with my landlord! I can fight with my landlord like it’s nobody’s business, but I feel 
like—I don’t feel like—or I feel like I have that option [to say ‘no’ to sex] but I have 
watched myself not take it in sexual situations. 
Many other participants expressed similar notions, and also associated it with the sentiment Evie 
expressed about the everyday cultural silencing of women’s stories about sexual and gendered 
violence. They talked about how women don’t communicate enough—with their partners and 
with each other—about their sex lives, including the potentially traumatic aspects. These 
participants elucidated how women are socialized to shut up about sex—including about 
infractions against their bodies. It is also important to note that this experience of ‘voicelessness’ 
is consistent with Depersonalization/Derealization Disorder, in that it involves a sense of 
detachment from one’s own thoughts, feelings, sensations, body, or actions (depersonalization), 
which is formally related to trauma as a Dissociative Disorder in the DSM-5. These women’s 
descriptions of their experiences of normalized sexual violence and, in some cases, pursuant 
trauma—or even more prosaic descriptions of the opacity of consent/coercion that they have 
experienced in their everyday lives and sexual relationships—shed much light on why many of 
them express the need to feel safe, comfortable, and trusting in order to be able to ‘lose 
themselves’ in a sexual experience. The women I interviewed were very aware of the role of 
gendered violence in their lack of desire, and of the violation of women’s bodies as a cultural 
trope and as a material reality. Ultimately, many placed utmost importance on negotiation, 
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intentionality, consent, trust, and safety during any sexual encounter, as a way to safeguard 
against pervasive gendered violence. 
 
The agency of the skin, embodied knowledge, and the effects of gendered violence on 
sexuality 
The low-desiring participants in this study were quite clear that regardless of any other biological 
or social factors, their experiences of sexual and gendered violence had deeply influenced their 
experiences of sex, and the substance of and their ability to pursue their own desires. Molly again 
discusses her experience of childhood sexual abuse: 
I remember very little, and a lot of what I feel about it is more like muscle memory—
there are times where I will have a very physical reaction, or feel something physical, but 
I’m not able to say ‘Okay, I feel this because he did this specific thing to me’…it’s 
frustrating to not be able to say ‘I know that this happened, and I know that that 
happened, and that that other thing happened’…and then certain weird things can trigger 
sort of a flashback…it’s like the stuff that I can’t deal with in my head comes out in my 
body. 
What Molly is describing is exactly in line with Criterion B3 of the diagnostic definition for 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder or PTSD (i.e., ‘flashbacks’). It warrants mentioning that Molly is 
likely a candidate for diagnosis with PTSD, but she initially came to me to participate in a study 
about low desire. What she describes regarding ‘muscle memory’ and ‘stuff she can’t deal with 
in her head coming out in her body’ is also consistent with somatization10. Her earlier 
                                                        
10
 ‘Somatization,’ or the conversion of anxiety or trauma into physical symptoms, does not fit 
with definitional criteria for Somatic Symptom and Related Disorders as they appear in the 
DSM-5. Psychologists, psychiatrists, and psychoanalysts have long been interested in the 
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descriptions of dissociating during sex are clearly in line with Depersonalization/Derealization 
Disorder, as well.  
 Some participants who experience pain upon penetration had similarly sophisticated 
analyses of how the experience of violation has affected their sexual bodies. Sarah discussed 
how her chronic pain condition, which is not specifically vaginal but which does make 
penetration uncomfortable for her, has deeply affected her desire to have sex (or rather, to avoid 
it)—with men, particularly. She explains how her body has become so accustomed to 
experiencing pain that she almost automatically ‘shuts down,’ often before the experience has 
even begun, in anticipation. Regina, who experiences pain upon penetration, described a similar 
phenomenon, and stated that her (male) partners were not as understanding about it as she 
wished they had been: 
Usually, I would pretend like it didn’t hurt…I even went to a physical therapist, she gave 
me these dildo-looking things—you go up in size to stretch and things like that and I did 
find that if I used that the day before, or a couple of hours before I was going to have sex, 
then that did help things…and then we kind of made it part of our thing, that I would do 
this, or maybe take a bath to relax things…but this all gets to be very mechanical, it is not 
the playful spontaneous sex that is fun and enjoyable, it starts to be like ‘Okay, how can 
we get it so that Regina’s vagina does not revolt?’ Like every time we had sex, I had all 
these chores to do in order to be able to have sex…  
                                                                                                                                                                                   
physical manifestation of repressed desires and traumatic experiences, as earlier explorations of 
hysteria clearly demonstrate (Breuer & Freud, 1955; Freud, 1963). But, although Molly’s 
description here may have been in line with Somatoform Disorders as they appeared in earlier 
versions of the DSM, including in the DSM-IV, the DSM-5 in general marks a shift away from 
psychosomatic explanations of trauma and psychic life, and a concomitant move toward 
cognitive-behavioral explanations (these shifts apply to Somatic Symptom and Related Disorders 
as well as to FSIAD). I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer of an earlier version of this 
essay for pointing this out. 
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This notion of her body ‘revolting’ against penetration is one that other participants with vaginal 
pain expressed. Maya, who has not been diagnosed with any physical dysfunction, but who has 
begun to experience more intense vaginal pain in the context of her marriage, described her 
thoughts on the etiology of the problem: 
It was always a little bit painful, but now it is just excruciatingly painful and I think it is 
because I am totally not into it… I find that I am shutting myself off…it’s like physical—
but I would imagine that it is totally linked to the psychological. I have told myself that I 
don’t want to do this anymore, and because of that, my body is devising ways of making 
it easier for me to prove that I cannot do it. And I am totally not feeling pain because I 
want to feel pain, I just feel pain, but I wonder about the psychosomatic aspect of it, that 
maybe it’s just, my body saying ‘Okay, well your mind doesn’t want to do it, so we don’t 
want to do it either’… 
Both Kelly and Astrid shared similar sentiments about the possibility of a psychophysiological 
materialization of their trauma and concomitant lack of desire as pain. Astrid’s story, articulated 
below, is particularly alarming in regard to these themes. She describes her body as waging war 
against a way of being sexual that she could simply no longer tolerate: 
I think my body stepped in where my mind wasn’t willing to step in or was incapable of 
stepping in at the time and said ‘This isn’t right, I don’t want to be submitted to this 
practice of being receptive to this kind of abusive treatment’—I think that my body just 
said ‘No!’ and sort of drew a line in the sand…this ‘disorder’—it changed everything for 
me, it made it impossible for me to continue to engage in this sort of dysfunctional 
relationship where I traded sex for security at the expense of my own identity and my 
own politics…I feel like my nonconsensual sex turned from only an emotionally painful 
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sex into also a physically painful sex and that that became a physically impossible sex 
over time to the point where I was no longer able to engage in that abusive, 
nonconsensual sex, just because my body made it impossible…  
In light of a discussion of somatic symptomology, these stories are particularly powerful. These 
participants’ words provide a sobering counter-narrative to the tales evolutionary psychology, 
experimental vaginal photoplethysmographic research, FSIAD, and the alternative female sexual 
response model tell about the embodied ‘truth’ of female desire. Rather than the female 
lubrication-swelling response being an indication of a woman’s evolved physical proclivity to 
become aroused, here, we have accounts of the body shutting down as a form of embodied revolt 
or resistance. As we have moved away from psychosomatic medicine and into the terrain of 
purported neurologically based differences with ‘organic’ etiologies and hormonal and 
evolutionary bases, these narratives may seem anachronistic or even anathema. They certainly 
feel out of place in our current neoliberal, biomedical, technoscientific moment, including within 
the larger cognitive-behavioral shift of the DSM-5. But these accounts beg the question of the 
psychosomatic, the somatoform; they hearken back to Breuer’s encounters with Anna O., to 
Freud’s with Dora, and to psychoanalytic conceptualizations which might have previously been 
framed as frigidity, hysteria, or other ‘peculiarly feminine neuroses’ of enigmatic, perplexing 
women of times past (Breuer & Freud, 1955; Freud, 1963). But much has also been written about 
embodied phenomena, experiences, processes, and practices as political acts, as forms of revolt 
or resistance, and as reclamations of bodies and identities which have been colonized and 
oppressed (Bordo, 1993; Cixous, 2004). With this in mind, might we consider certain 
manifestations of low desire among women, and their physiological effects, as potentially 
political, subversive, or even as insurrectionary? 
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Beyond comorbidity: The case for sequelae 
Some scientists and clinicians, today as in the past, have argued that women’s sexuality is 
inherently complex, responsive, and dissociative, while men’s sexuality is direct, initiating, and 
concordant. Although the researchers and clinicians I interrogate here suggest this in different 
ways, and to different extents, the designers of the FSIAD diagnosis in the DSM-5 (Brotto, 2010; 
Graham, 2010) rely on research conducted to support the alternative female sexual response 
model (Basson 2000, 2001), and both FSIAD and the alternative female sexual response model 
are presented within a gendered framework in which objective bodily response is measured 
against subjective psychological desire (Chivers, 2010; Chivers & Bailey, 2005; Chivers, Seto & 
Blanchard, 2007; Chivers, et al., 2010). This last domain of scientific inquiry, in which men’s 
and women’s mental perceptions are measured against their embodied responses, seems to 
sustain a search for the ‘truth’ of sexual difference, and continues a project in which female 
sexual credibility and the legitimacy of female desire are persistently questioned. Taken together, 
all of this research and diagnostic framing suggests that male sexuality and female sexuality are 
quite different, and none of it theorizes this difference, analyzes the interpersonal, environmental, 
and social reasons for this difference, or considers the consequences of continuing this pursuit of 
sexual difference in regards to desire11. 
At least for the low-desiring women I interviewed for this project, it may be true that 
women’s sexualities are complex—and, in some cases, characterized by dissociation. But, these 
                                                        
11
 An important exception to this lack of theorization is Chivers & Bailey (2005) and Chivers, et 
al. (2010), who suggest that female mind-body discordance and the ease with which women are 
posited to become objectively sexually stimulated could potentially be the result of evolutionary 
adaptations in ancestral females that have evolved to protect the vagina from tearing during rape, 
in line with the tenets of evolutionary psychology (e.g., as it is epitomized by Symons, 1979). 
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interviews make it clear that this complexity is primarily due to sociorelational, environmental, 
and psychostructural factors, including sexual and gendered violence and subsequent experiences 
of trauma—which are completely elided in much of the scientific research on and clinical 
framing of sexual desire. Not only this, but trauma and low desire are held apart discursively in 
the DSM-5 and in the research that supports it. What violence may potentially be enacted—
discursively and materially—when the influence of gendered and sexualized violations on desire 
is not explored, theorized, and politicized? Why is trauma not fully taken into account in the 
FSIAD diagnosis? Why must we hold onto a model of comorbidity rather than moving fully 
toward etiological investigations, which might include ontologies of symptomology, syndrome, 
and sequelae, and which would account for the co-occurrence and complex development of 
trauma which influences desire (or its lack)? In her argument for the lumping of Female Sexual 
Arousal Disorder (FSAD) with HSDD in Women (what would become the new FSIAD 
diagnosis), Graham (2010) called for an increased attention to ‘specifiers’ for women’s sexual 
concerns (e.g., ‘individual vulnerability factors’ including ‘history of abuse experiences’), as I 
discussed previously. But many of these specifiers did not make it into the DSM-5 criteria for 
FSIAD, and thus we see a continued reluctance to engage with etiology, and with the notions of 
syndrome and sequelae, in favor of a neurobiologized and cognitive-behavioral ‘snapshot’ model 
of mental health or illness. 
The inclusion of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) in the DSM-III in 1980 marked 
the first time that environmental, social, and political traumas were explicitly taken into account 
in a diagnosis. Trauma- and Stressor-Related and Dissociative Disorders continue to be the only 
diagnostic groupings in the DSM-5 which are configured outside of an individualizing and 
increasingly neurobiologizing model of mental pathology, and which instead take into account 
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external, historical events as constitutive of disorder patterns themselves. Although PTSD was 
originally based on the experience of ‘shell shock’ among male war veterans, research by 
feminist clinicians and scholars has illuminated how so much of the trauma that women (and 
other disproportionately traumatized populations) live through is not ‘outside the range’ of 
everyday human experience (Brison, 2008; Brown, 1991)—but it is related to sexual and 
gendered violence that is rarely confronted or interrogated in a patriarchal and heterosexist 
milieu. This dull trauma that results from mundane violence is not glamorous or exotic; rather, it 
is so insidious precisely because it is so routine, so familiar. But, as Herman (1992) and Leys 
(2000) have emphasized, discussions of trauma have fallen in and out of vogue over the course 
of the history of the DSM and in the history of psychology, more generally. Arguments have 
been made for a more in-depth, complex, developmental, and potentially etiological investigation 
of trauma (van der Kolk, 2005; van der Kolk & van der Hart, 1995), but more recent 
configurations of psychopathology have generally not taken this complexity into account. That 
PTSD is more prevalent in women and that women tend to experience PTSD for longer durations 
than men do is acknowledged in the DSM-5, under ‘Gender-Related Diagnostic Issues’ regarding 
PTSD, as is the fact that ‘at least some of the increased risk for PTSD in females appears to be 
attributable to a greater likelihood of exposure to traumatic events, such as rape, and other forms 
of interpersonal violence’ (APA, 2013, p. 278). Trauma- and Stressor-Related Disorders, 
Dissociative Identity Disorders, Somatic Symptom and Related Disorders, depression, and a 
variety of other diagnoses are acknowledged as more likely to affect women, and all of these 
disorders are understood as expressing a high degree of comorbidity with each other. 
Concomitantly, comorbidity among low sexual interest/arousal and depression, anxiety, thyroid 
problems, current physical and sexual abuse in adulthood, substance use, and other medical 
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factors are accounted for in the FSIAD diagnosis. Given the acknowledgment of comorbidity in 
these two very separate regards, the absence of FSIAD as comorbid with these others gendered 
diagnoses and the absence of trauma as comorbid with FSIAD are glaring. These lacunae are 
evidence of the vacuousness of the concept of comorbidity. 
Rather than either reassessing its value or reconceptualizing ‘comorbidity,’ I propose that 
the complex and developmental etiology of low desire in women—which cannot be disentangled 
from the everyday experience of sexual and gendered violence and pursuant trauma—be taken 
more seriously instead. The reality of widespread violence against women and the words of my 
participants (which, although part of a small-sample study, suggest a possible link between low 
desire and the experience of gendered violence and pursuant trauma among some women) 
indicate the necessity of a new clinical orientation to the assessment and treatment of low female 
desire. The medical and ethical implications of this are clear, and I argue that they should 
include: 1.) discussing sexual history, including traumatic history, thoroughly during any FSIAD 
intake in light of the lack of specifiers in the diagnostic entry, 2.) de-individualizing what are 
clearly relational sexual problems (but which are, as of now, discussed in relational terms 
disproportionately when a woman’s ‘receptivity’ is in question), and 3.) more adequately 
conceptualizing etiology, with a renewed emphasis on symptomology, syndrome, and 
sequelae—which are always sociopolitical, inter-relational, and based in gendered and 
sexualized structural-environmental realities involving unequal distributions of power. In 
undertaking this new orientation to treatment and care, we would responsibly set up a new 
protocol for understanding how the phenomena that disorders reflect both correlate and present 
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